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FAIR PLANS: HISTORY, HOLTZMAN AND
THE ARSON-FOR-PROFIT HAZARD
I. Introduction
Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plans were imple-
mented in twenty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico pursuant to the Urban Property Insurance Protection and
Reinsurance Act of 19681 in an attempt to ameliorate urban deterio-
ration by reducing unfair insurance practices. FAIR plans provide
insurance to property owners denied insurance in the voluntary
market. These plans operate as insurance pools whereby each insur-
ance company participates in writing higher risk business according
to the proportionate share of property insurance which the company
voluntarily underwrites in the state.
Subsequent to the urban riots of the late sixties, it became appar-
ent that urban areas could not grow and prosper without access to
vital property insurance for businesspeople and homeowners. Rec-
ognizing the magnitude of the problem, the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders established a separate National Advisory
Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas.2 The panel aptly de-
scribed the situation as an "insurance crisis"3 requiring a joint solu-
tion by property owners, the insurance industry, and local, state,
and federal governments. This Comment will outline the history of
FAIR plans, their federally mandated guidelines, and the state's
implementation of such requirements. The impact of the recent
Holtzman amendment, enacted in 1978, will also be explored. Fi-
1. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb-1749bbb-21
(1976), as amended by Pub. L. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2097 (1978).
2. THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS,
MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES (1968) [hereinafter cited as PANEL REPORT]. The
Panel was chaired by Richard J. Hughes, then Governor of New Jersey, and is sometimes
referred to as the Hughes Panel. The Vice Chairman was William W. Scranton, former
Governor of Pennsylvania. Other members were Frank L. Farwell, President, Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., George S. Harris, President, Chicago Metropolitan Mutual Insurance Co.; A
Addison Roberts, President, Reliance Insurance Co.; Walter E. Washington, Commissioner,
District of Columbia and Former Chairman, N.Y.C. Housing Authority; Frank M. Wozen-
craft, Ass't Attorney General in Charge of Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice. Id.
at v.
3. A survey of approximately 1,500 businesspeople and 1,500 homeowners in poverty areas
in six major cities revealed that more than 40% of businesspeople, and almost 30% of home-
owners had serious property insurance problems. Id. at 2. For complete results of the survey,
see id. at 126-60.
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nally, the relationship between FAIR plans and arson-for-profit will
be examined.
II. History of FAIR Plans
In the Report by the President's National Advisory Panel on In-
surance in Riot-Affected Areas, Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our
Cities, I the panel emphasized the role of insurance in the revitaliza-
tion of urban core areas.' The Panel Report concluded that the
insurance crisis resulted from the unavailability and high cost of
property insurance in the nation's inner cities.' The Panel Report
brought attention to the issue of insurance unavailability,7 but its
examination was limited in breadth by the government's attempt
to avert further social and political upheaval. This was accom-
plished by focusing on one aspect of the urban problem: irresponsi-
ble insurance industry activity.8
Although heightened public concern about under-insurance in
inner cities followed the riots of 1967,1 the underwriting practices
which aggravated the problem were in operation for more than
twenty years. The beginnings of the residual market'0 comprising
4. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2. The hearings which preceded the Panel Report are re-
ported as the HEARINGS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN
RIoT-AFFECTED AREAS (1967).
5. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. The report stated:
Insurance is essential to revitalize our cities. It is a cornerstone of credit. Without
insurance, banks and other financial institutions will not-and cannot-make loans.
New housing cannot be constructed, and existing housing cannot be repaired. New
businesses cannot he opened, and existing businesses cannot expand, or even sur-
vive. . . . Communities without insurance are communities without hope.
Id.
6. Id. at 2. For a statistical documentation of the Panel's conclusion, see id. at 115-60
(Appendix A).
7. The term "insurance unavailability".also refers to the cost of insurance. If property
coverage is unaffordable, it becomes, for all practical purposes, "unavailable."
8. An analysis of the multifarious causes of urban deterioration is beyond the scope of
this Comment. The conduct of the insurance industry is only one factor contributing to the
decline of the inner cities. A plethora of other factors exist, including those attributable to
the government. Two notable examples of post-World War II federal policies largely responsi-
ble for urban decay were extensive highway construction, and the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration's cheap mortgaging arrangements. These policies accelerated the growth of surburban
areas and the flight of the middle class from urban areas.
9. See statements of urban core residents, PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 115-26.
10. The residual market includes those properties that insurers have systematically re-
fused to insure. This "market of last resort" is
a byproduct of the intense competition over the past twenty years by insurance compa-
nies for a select market: those homeowners considered least exposed to hazard . ...
[Vol. VII
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those properties deemed uninsurable by the voluntary market can
be traced to the emergence of package homeowner policies in the
early 1940's.1 The risk selectivity fundamental to the insurance.
business excluded risks which insurance underwriters considered
undesirable. Urban properties deemed insurable were typically
denied comprehensive coverage and limited to traditional lines of
insurance. 2 The terms which describe the presumption of uninsur-
ability without reference to the individual property: redlining, 3
The wider separation between homes in suburban settings reduced the risk of fire
spreading from adjacent properties. Additionally, improved wiring and construction
safeguarded homes from fires and made the suburban home a preferred risk from the
viewpoint of the insurance industry.
FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, INSUR-
ANCE CRISIS IN URBAN AMERICA 3-4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT]. In
an effort to attract this business, insurers offered comprehensive coverage at reduced rates.
Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 4 n.4. The report noted that
[tihe advent of the homeowner policy in the early 40's followed the liberalization of
State laws that permitted insurance companies to branch out into diverse insurance
fields. As a result of this liberalization and the social changes in the 50's and 60's, the
marketing of the homeowners policy intensified in suburban areas.
Id.
12. Traditional lines of insurance are limited to fire and extended coverage excluding
burglary, theft, and personal liability. Extended coverage includes windstorm, hail, explo-
sion, riot, riot attending a strike, civil commotion, aircraft, vehicles, and smoke. PANEL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
13. Redlining has become the generic term for any arbitrary geographical discrimination
practiced by insurance companies or institutions. The name reflects the former practice of-
insurance companies evidenced by the following underwriting manual:
An underwriter should be aware of the following situations in his territory:
1. The blighted areas.
2. The redevelopment operations.
3. Peculiar weather conditions which might make for a concentration of windstorm
or hail losses.
4. The economic makeup of the area.
5. The nature of the industries in the area .....
A good way to keep this information available is by the use of a red line around the
questionable areas on territorial maps centrally located in the Underwriting Division
for ease of reference by all Underwriting personnel.
PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 29 (emphasis added by PANEL REPORT).
While insurance companies may no longer explicitly identify which areas are redlined, the
same exclusion occurs through more surreptitious methods. Redlining has been described as
"a kind of arbitrary, guilt-by-association indictment of entire neighborhoods or even cities
that excludes many decent risks from access to a free insurance market." INSURANCE CRISIS
REPORT, supra note 10. at 28. Numerous reports by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) and such states as Illinois, Michigan, and New York, consistently
reaffirm the continuance of the practice. Id. at 30.38.
The Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) analyzed neighborhood data compiled by the
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black-out maps, knock-out (KO) areas, and zip code zoning, convey
the insurance industry's admonition regarding properties within
such designated areas-"don't write the business."' 4 The location
approach resulted in "dumping" marginal properties into the high
risk market. 5 The anticipation of decay often brought about its
fruition."
The insurance industry acknowledged the restricted market situ-
ation by 1966 and urged agents, insurance companies, government,
rating bureaus, and insurance commissioners to accept the respon-
sibility of providing insurance for well-maintained properties re-
gardless of location or value. 7 Flexible rating plans were developed
in accordance with the insurance maxim that "everything is insur-
able at a price." Insurance was sometimes written through a sub-
standard rating plan, applying surcharges for specific hazards. An
alternative method was writing insurance through an excess rate
(ER) plan," which required written consent to be charged over
manual rates. A second alternative was obtaining insurance through
the surplus lines market."
New York Public Interest Research Group (NY PIRG) and found a strong correlation between
FAIR plan writing and racial composition (nonwhite areas having the heaviest concentration
of FAIR plan policies). A strong correlation was also found with FAIR plan writing in areas
with many vacant buildings. A weak correlation was found between FAIR plan writing and
the age of the building. Id. at 30-38.
14. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
15. INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 18.
16. Id. at 27-28.
17. 111966 NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMMISSIONERS PROCEEDINGS 522, cited in Works, Whatever's
FAIR-Adequacy, Equity, And the Underwriting Prerogatives in Property Insurance
Markets, 56 NEB. L. REV. 445, 485 n.88. The industry's call for responsible action was not
predicated on altruistic concerns. Rather, it was a desperate, but unsuccessful attempt to
avoid governmental interference.
18. Excess rating plans allow an underwriter to charge higher rates based on perceived
hazardous conditions not included in standard rate schedules. These might include factors
such as the building's location in a heavily congested area or an area otherwise especially
exposed to the spread of fire or inadequate fire protection for highly valued buildings. This
method permitted complete rate flexibility so long as written consent was obtained. PANEL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34.
19. The surplus lines carrier of insurance offers specialized coverage, i.e., coverage
not readily available in an area or to a certain class of insureds, and is often not
licensed to do business in the State where the risk(s) is located. As provided by State
charters, the surplus lines carrier does business in a State by transferring its insurance
liability in whole or in part through reinsurance to State licensed companies. The
attenuated connection between surplus carrier, reinsurer and policyholder leaves the
consumer most vulnerable to summary cancellations of his insurance or to default of
legitimate claims.
INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 3 n.2.
FAIR PLANS
In addition to authorizing price-differentiated rating structures,
various states responded with some form of Urban Area Plan.?
These plans attempted to provide a means for distinguishing be-
tween insurable and uninsurable properties, usually through an
inspection by the local rating bureau. Results of the inspection were
sent to the insurance company designated by the insured. The in-
surer maintained discretion over acceptance, conditional accep-
tance or denial of the risk. Periodic reports were usually required
to be sent to the state insurance department so that participation
could be monitored.2 An alternative course was exemplified by the
"Watts Pool," organized in California after the riots of 1965. The
pool was intended to provide last chance coverage to those responsi-
ble property owners denied insurance elsewhere. The participating
companies shared an agreed percentage of premiums, expenses and
losses."
The major recommendation of the Panel Report was to expand
the type of services provided by Urban Area Plans by instituting
state-regulated Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR)
plans. 23 As an incentive to insurance industry participation, the
Reportsuggested formation of a National Insurance Development
Corporation (NIDC) to provide federal riot reinsurance for compa-
nies paying reinsurance premiums in FAIR plan states.
III. Federal Legislation
The Congressional response to the insurance crisis of American
inner cities is found in the Urban Property Insurance and Reinsur-
ance Act of 1968,5 the statute authorizing FAIR plans and the con-
20. Before 1968. Urban Area Plans were implemented, formally or informally, in the
following states: California, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. PANEL REPORT,
supra note 2, at 56.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 75-79.
23. Id. at 87.
24. Id. at 101.
25. See note 1 supra. Congress, in its Findings and Declaration of Purpose of the 1968 Act,
determined that
the capacity of the private property insurance industry to provide adequate insurance
is threatened, and the continuity of such property insurance protection is essential to
the extension of credit in these areas; and . . . the national interest demands urgent
action by the Congress to assure that essential lines of property insurance, including
lines providing protection against riot and civil commotion damage will be available
to property owners at reasonable cost . . ..
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comitant federal riot reinsurance. FAIR plans are administered
under the insurance authority in each state or authorized by state
law.2" Only those insurers participating in the FAIR plan can receive
the benefits of riot reinsurance. In the spirit of the "creative federal-
ism" of the sixties, and in recognition of insurance as primarily a
state concern," the federal guidelines were designed to be broad
enough to allow for variations by cooperating states.29 The 1968 Act
The purposes of this title are, therefore, to (1) encourage and assist the various State
insurance authorities and the property insurance industry to develop and carry out
statewide programs which will make necessary property insurance coverage against
fire, crime, and other perils more readily available.for residential, business, and other
properties meeting reasonable underwriting standards; and (2) provide a Federal pro-
gram of reinsurance against abnormally high property insurance losses resulting from
riots and other civil commotion, placing appropriate financial responsibility on the
States to share in such losses ....
S. 3497, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 547, 648.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(b).
27. MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 251, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 3956, 3959 (1968).
28. Up until 1944, the Supreme Court had consistently held that "[ilssuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce." Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183
(1869). The cases which reaffirmed this position all dealt with the validity of state statutes,
e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County,
231 U.S. 495 (1913), and not with any Act of Congress. In United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the Court held that an insurance company which
conducts its business across state lines is not beyond the regulatory power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 553.
After finding that a price-fixing conspiracy existed, the Court also held that Congress did
not intend to exempt insurance from the broad scope of the Sherman Act. Id. at 560. The
Court noted the exaggeration inherent in the argument that the Sherman Act would invali-
date many state insurance laws, stating: "n]o states authorize combinations of insurance
companies to coerce, intimidate, and boycott competitors and consumers in the manner here
alleged, and it cannot be that any companies have acquired a vested right to engage in such
destructive business practices." Id. at 562. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-
15 (1976), reasserted the authority of the states to regulate and tax insurance companies if
not contrary to the will of Congress. Seizing on the language of Justice Black in the majority
opinion in South-Eastern Underwriters, the application of the Sherman Act to the insurance
business was narrowed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act to cases of "boycott, coercion, or
intimidation." 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976). The Court noted, however, that the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act "shall be applicable to the business
of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law." 15 U.S.C. §
1012(b) (1976).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(b). An overview of the functioning of FAIR plan operations will
be helpful to illustrate the various approaches. Data from Puerto Rico were not available.
FAIR plan associations can operate as one of three different types of carriers: seventeen are
syndicates (the FAIR plan operates like an insurance company), seven are single servicing
carriers (one insurance company performs the administrative functions), and three are multi-
ple servicing carriers (several companies perform the administrative functions). Regardless
of the type of plan organization, profits and losses are shared by all insurance companies
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indicates that FAIR plans are "designed to make essential property
insurance more readily available in, but not necessarily limited to,
urban areas. 0
There are ten minimum federally imposed criteria,3' adopted al-
most entirely from the Panel Report,3" which must be included in
each state's FAIR plan. No risk is to be written at surcharged rates
or denied essential property insurance unless an inspection reveals
that the risk does not meet "reasonable underwriting standards at
the applicable premium rate."33 Essential property insurance is de-
fined as:
participating in the plan within the state. PROPERTY INSURANCE PLANS SERVICE OFFICE
(PIPSO), NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON PROPERTY INSURANCE, PIPSO COMPENDIUM OF INDIVIDUAl.
STATE PROPERTY INSURANCE PLANS 6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PIPSO REPORT]. Sixteen
FAIR plans provide statewide coverage, eight cover only specific geographic areas. Two other
plans have independent criteria for eligibility (e.g., in Kentucky, eligibility is based.on fire
protection class ratings of one through eight; in California, the Insurance Commisioner desig-
nates eligible urban and brush areas). Id.
All plans provide minimum coverage which includes fire, extended coverage and malicious
mischief. Four plans provide crime insurance (California, Michigan, New Jersey, and Wis-
consin) and six plans include sprinkler leakage. Illinois, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin provide a package homeowner policy. Id. The state legislatures redefined "basic
or essential property insurance" to include this homeowner coverage. A federal amend-
ment was proposed to accomplish the same result. See note 34 infra.
Twenty-one states exclude farm properties from FAIR plan coverage. Fifteen states
exclude manufacturing concerns (with four allowing coverage on certain conditions relating
to number of employees or insurable value). Seven states exclude mobile homes, except six
cover the homes if they have permanent foundations. Id. at 7, 13.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(b). Although this Comment concentrates on the impact of
FAIR plans in urban areas, many low value rural properties are insured by FAIR plans. Also,
seven states have a similar program for sharing high risks from natural disasters through
State Beach Plans. These states are Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and Texas. PIPSO REPORT, supra note 29, at 17-25.
31. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb-3(b)(1) to -3(b)(10).
32. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 87-113 (Recommended Program to Solve Urban Core
Insurance Problems).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(b)(1). It is significant that such a crucial term to the proper
functioning of FAIR plans as "reasonable underwriting standards" is not defined. For a
comprehensive discussion of this and related issues, see Works, Whatever's FAIR-Ade-
quacy, Equity, And the Underwriting Prerogative in Property Insurance Markets, 56
NEB. L. REv. 445.
It is possible to predict which properties will probably not meet "reasonable underwriting
standards" on the basis of various state standards for "uninsurable property." All FAIR plans
exclude properties which are vacant and open to trespass, properties in poor physical condi-
tion, including unrepaired fire damage, and properties which are used in violation of law or
public policy. Twenty states disallow coverage on the basis of poor housekeeping, including
overcrowding or storage of rubbish and flammable materials. Two states deny inclusion in
the FAIR plan due to violations of building and safety codes. Three states (Illinois, Montana,
and New York) make properties with delinquent taxes ineligible. PIPSO REPORT, supra note
29, at 7.
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insurance against direct loss to property as defined and limited in standard
fire policies and extended coverage endorsement thereon, as approved by the
State insurance authority, and insurance for such types, classes, and loca-
tions of property against the perils of vandalism, malicious mischief, bur-
glary, or theft, as the Secretary by rule shall designate. Such insurance shall
not include automobile insurance and shall not include insurance on such
types of manufacturing risks as may be excluded by the State insurance
authority.3'
Under a FAIR plan, property owners have a right to an inspection
and insurance if the property meets the usual standards for insura-
bility. Either the property owner, his representative, the insurer,
agent, broker, or other producer may request an inspection.15 A
tenant may obtain an inspection and insurance under the plan de-
spite the building owner's absence .3 The inspection report is sent
to the insurer or an all-industry placement facility. 7
The ultimate discretion is left to the insurer to determine whether
the risk meets the "reasonable underwriting standards" criteria.
This is a questionable policy, as is demonstrated by the original
rationale for the FAIR plans. These urban properties were denied
insurance on the voluntary market precisely because the risk
seemed unreasonably high. The Panel Report determined that the
classification of certain risks as unreasonably high, often was not
predicated on any factor other than geographic location. The only
countervailing provision to this practice appears as a condition for
obtaining riot reinsurance. A state or the property insurance indus-
try in a state must comply with the FAIR plan requirements and
agree "to make essential property insurance available without re-
gard to environmental hazards." '3' Environmental hazard is defined
as "any hazardous condition that might give rise to loss under an
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-2(a)(5). Congresswoman Holtzman introduced a bill to amend
§ 1203(a)(5) of the National Housing Act which did not pass. 124 CONG. REc. H2661 (daily
ed. April 10, 1978). The bill would have added the following language to the definition of
"essential property insurance": "Such insurances shall include forms of insurance which are
by the Secretary, by rule, to be property insurance primarily (notwithstanding that they
contain and element of liability or other casualty insurance), such as, but not limited to,
homeowners insurance." Id.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(b)(2). The inspection request need not be in writing. Id.
36. Id. § 1749bbb.3(b)(3).
37. Id. § 1749bbb-4.
38. PANEL REPoler, supra note 2, at 5-6.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-9(a)(2).
[Vol. VII
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insurance contract, but which is beyond the control of the property
owner. "40
The insurer may agree to write insurance immediately,4' on a
contingent basis if specified improvements are made,42 or refuse to
write the insurance with specific reasons for such action .4 The pro-
spective insured is entitled to appeal the insurer's decision to the
state insurance authority and must be informed of this right by the
insurance agent." Provisions are made for coding FAIR plan poli-
cies 4 . for evaluation purposes and for statistical reports on accept-
ance, conditional acceptance and denials.4' The statute also man-
dates reasonable notice requirements before cancellation or nonre-
newal. 47 Finally, in order to reach those intended to benefit by the
availability of FAIR plans, continuing public education programs
are to be undertaken by insurers, agents, and brokers."
Each FAIR plan must include an all-industry placement facility4
which arranges inspections, distributes the risks equitably among
insurers and seeks to provide insurance up to the full insurable value
of the risk. Industry cooperation is specifically enlisted through a
pledge by insurers to fully participate in carrying out the FAIR
plan.5 0 Federal control was enhanced by providing that the Secre-
tary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) may, after consult-
ation with the Advisory Board," modify plan criteria if such action
40. Id. § 1749bbb-2(a)(4) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 1749bbb-3(b)(5)(A)(i). The insurer may also write the insurance with surcharges
(where authorized), but must inform the insured of improvements which could be made to
reduce the charge to an unsurcharged premium rate. Id.
42. Id. § 1749bbb-3(b)(5)(A)(ii).
43. Id. § 1749bbb-3(b)(5)(B).
44. Id. § 1749bbb-3(b)(6). Appeals can concern the decision not to insure,' cancellation,
non-renewal, or premium rate assessment. Typically, the seeker of insurance must address
any complaints to the FAIR plan itself before appealing to the state insurance authority,
except that FIA requirements eliminate this intermediary stage when an insured appeals a
five-day cancellation notice.
45. Id. § 1749bbb-3(b)(7).
46. Id. § 1749bbb-3(b)(8).
47. Id. § 1749bbb-3(b)(9).
48. Id. § 1749bbb-3(h)(10).
49. Id. § 1749bbb-4.
50. Id. § 1749bbb-5.
51. Id. § 1749bbb-1 establishes an Advisory Board of nineteen members, appointed by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Board, by statute, must include
representatives of the insurance industry, the public; state and local governments, and the
federal government. The Board's functions entail review of policies and general advisement
to the Secretary as the Board sees fit. Id.
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would improve the programs, or waive certain criteria if local cir-
cumstances justify this action. 2
The Secretary of HUD is authorized to offer to any insurer or pool,
subject to certain conditions," reinsurance against property losses
resulting from riots or civil disorders. 4 The basic reinsurance con-
tract offers combined reinsurance only on standard lines of property
insurance, " including fire and extended coverage, vandalism and
malicious mischief, other allied lines of fire insurance, burglary and
theft, and analogous risks covered by multiple peril policies., Insur-
ers may then separately purchase reinsurance on lines including
inland marine, glass, boiler and machinery, ocean marine, aircraft,
physical damage, and such other lines which the Secretary may
designate by regulation.57 The 1968 Act's provision for reinsurance
coverage for losses from riots or civil disorders was designed to serve
two purposes: (1) to reassure insurance companies fearful of insur-
ing in inner-city areas due to the potential of disastrous losses from
further urban disruptions, and (2) to operate as an incentive to
participate in authorized FAIR plans, since only FAIR plan insurers
52. Id. § 1749bbb-6.
53. Id. § 1749bbb-9.
54. Id. § 1749bbb-7(a)(1). The contract, at § XVII (8) provides these definitions:
(8) "Loss resulting from riot" means:
loss of or damage to property actually and immediately resulting from an overt and
tumultuous disturbance of the public peace by three or more persons mutually assist-
ing one another, or otherwise acting in concert, in the execution of a common purpose
through the unlawful use of force and violence.
"Loss resulting from civil disorder" means:
(A) Loss of or damage to property actually and immediately resulting from any pattern
of unlawful incidents taking place within close proximity both as to time and place
and involving damage to property intentionally caused by persons apparently having
the primary motivation of disturbing the public peace through civil disruption, civil
disobedience. or civil protest; provided that at least two of such related incidents result
in property damage in excess of $1,000 each; or
(B) Loss of or damage to property actually and immediately resulting from any occur-
rence involving property damage in excess of $2,000 caused by persons whose unlawful
conduct in so causing the occurrence manifests their primary purpose of disturbing the
public peace through civil disruption, civil disobedience, or civil protest.
See Federal Insurance Administration, Reinsurance Claims Guidelines 1 (August 1977).
This definition basically follows the common law definition of riot. The disturbance must
be clamorous and violent and must involve at least three persons. In addition, there must be
evidence of concerted intent to cooperate among the perpetrators. There must be an unlawful
use of force which results in property damage. Id.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-7(a)(2). '
56. Id. § 1749bbb-2(a)(13)(A)-(E).
57. Id. § 1749bbb-2(a)(13)(F)-(K).
FAIR PLANS
are eligible for federally subsidized reinsurance.5"
The statute provides for a commitment by each state to reimburse
the Department of Housing and Urban Development for certain
reinsured losses in a given contract year up to five percent of the
aggregate property insurance premiums earned in a state for rein-
surance. This provision is activated only when the reinsured losses
paid exceed the total of reinsurance premiums received and the
excess of "(i) the total premiums earned by the Secretary for rein-
surance in that State. .. over (ii) any amounts paid by the Secre-
tary for reinsured losses that were incurred during such period.' '5
In addition to the reserve funds of each state in the National Insur-
ance Development Fund (NIDF) accumulated from reinsurance
premiums which would be exhausted before state participation is
required, there is an additional buffer provided by a floating nation-
wide reserve fund, which at present has approximately $28 million
of unallocated funds."' The procedures by which each state obtains
resources to pay their share of the losses when required, are deter-
mined individually by each -state. No riot loss to date has triggered
the provision calling for state involvement in riot losses.'" Reinsur-
ance is only available to insurers in a state with a FAIR plan which
includes a provision making essential property insurance available
without regard to environmental hazards. As previously noted, 2 this
provision is designed to curtail redlining practices.
Two important amendments were passed in 1970.3 The Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1970 established an Office of Review
58. Id. §§ 1749bbb-7 to -10. Recently, due to the Holtzman amendment which requires
that FAIR plan rates be equal to voluntary market rates as an additional condition for ob-
taining federal riot reinsurance, see text accompanying note 75 infra, the need for federal
riot reinsurance has been questioned. Opponents to the amendment assert that reinsurance
can be obtained in the private market at affordable rates. The rates are considered afford-
able, even if higher than the rates charged by the federal government, in view of the savings
to the insurer 'by not lowering FAIR plan rates to voluntary market levels, as required by
the Holtzman amendment. News from N.Y. State Senator John R. Dunne, Fire Insurance
Under the "FAIR" Plan: The Federal Directive to Lower Fire Insurance Rates for "FAIR"
Plan Policyholders: Should [New York) State Comply? at 4 (Jan. 22, 1979).
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-9(a)(1).
60. News from Congresswoman Holtzman 2 (Jan. 29, 1979).
61. INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-9(a)(2). See text accompanying note 40 supra.
63. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-6a, -10a (1970).
For a discussion of these amendments, see Comment, The Central City Insurance Crisis:
Experience Under the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, 38 U. CHI. L.
REv. 665 (1971).
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and Compliance6' under the Federal Insurance Administration
(FIA), and agency under the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), to insure that the purposes of the 1968 Act
were being carried out, especially regarding the mandate to make
essential property insurance "readily available."" The more sub-
stantive change was the creation of direct federal insurance against
burglary and theft." The Secretary of HUD was granted authority
to ascertain whether crime insurance "is available at affordable
rates." 7 To remedy the market's failure to provide this commodity
through private or state action, the Secretary was empowered to
offer crime insurance through the facilities of the federal govern-
ment,5 5
IV. The Holtzman Amendment
The Holtzman amendment, named after its sponsor, Congress-
woman Elizabeth Holtzman, became law on October 31, 1978.69 Sec-
tion 1749bbb-3 was amended by adding the following new subsec-
tion at the end thereof:7"
(c) At least one-third of the voting members of every board of directors, board
of governors, advisory committee, and other governing or advisory board or
committee for each plan described in subsection (b) shall be individuals who
are not employed by, or otherwise affiliated with, insurers, insurance agents,
brokers, producers, or other entities of the insurance industry.
The provision requiring at least one-third of the voting members
of the FAIR plan governing boards to be independent representa-
tives of the public, unconnected with the insurance industry would,
according to its sponsor, "help assure protection of consumers in the
plan and neighborhoods served by it. Given the critical impact of
board decisions on the future of many neighborhoods, it is uncons-
cionable not to allow citizens to have a voice in policies which affect
them so directly."' The FAIR plan states split three ways regarding
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-6a.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 1749bbb-loa.
67. Id. § 1749bbb-10a(a). "Affordable rate" is defined as: "Such premium rate as the
Secretary determines would permit the purchase of a specific type of insurance coverage by
a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances with due regard to the costs and bene-
fits involved." Id. § 1749bbb-2(a)(1).
68. Id. § 1749bbb-10a(b).
69. Pub. L. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2097 (1978) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3).
70. 92 Stat. at 2097-98.
71. 124 CONG. REC. H2660 (daily ed. April 10, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman).
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compliance with the public membership provision. One-third of the
states have adopted the required number of public representatives,
one-third have not complied, and one-third have remained unde-
cided. 2 In response to questions by the House Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Development, the American Insurance
Association (AIA) stated: "AIA would welcome representation on
FAIR plan governing boards by responsible members of the public.
• . . Those representatives have often made constructive contribu-
tions."73 This enthusiastic support was tempered by another official
statement which conditioned fulfillment of the proposal on the in-
dustry's retention of majority control.7
The Holtzman amendment also added the following provision to
section 1749bbb-3(b):75
(11) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, on and after Janu-
ary 31, 1979, no risk within the plan shall be insured at rate higher than the
rates set by the principal State-licensed rating organization for essential
property insurance in the voluntary market, except that this provision shall
not be deemed to prohibit the application to any such risk, on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis, of condition charges for substandard physical conditions within
the control of the applicant for insurance as set by the principal State-
licensed rating organization for the voluntary market.
The bitter controversy over the Holtzman amendment focused
72. It is expected that the states which have not yet adopted the minimum one-third
public representative membership quota on the various boards and committees, will comply
before the federal riot reinsurance contracts expire on 'September 30, 1979. FIA issues these
contracts for one year terms. It should be noted that whereas riot reinsurance was termi-
nated for companies obtaining reinsurance in states which had not complied with the rate
equalization mandate, similar action was not taken cancelling reinsurance on the basis of'
noncompliance with the public representation mandate. The different consequences of'
noncompliance are attributable to the language of the amendment itself. The public repre-
sentative section indicates no particular time limitation. It is expected that compliance will
be necessary to obtain or renew reinsurance contracts for the next contract term period.
However, the rate parity section specifically indicates that FAIR plans must alter their rat-
ing schedules, where necessary, by January 31, 1979. Failure to meet this deadline resulted
in cancellation of riot reinsurance contracts. Interview with Property Insurance Plans Service
Office (PIPSO) (May 10, 1979).
73. Testimony by the Honorable Elizabeth Holtzman before the New York State Insur-
ance Department 8. (Jan. 8, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Holtzman Testimony].
74. George M. Mulligan, vice president and associate general counsel of the American
Insurance Association noted: "The retention of majority control of the FAIR Plan's board of
directors is also an important element of our committee considerations in order to assure that
the FAIR Plan is operating in an efficient manner." American Insurance Association News 2
(Jan. 8, 1979).
75. 92 Stat. at 2097-98.
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almost entirely on the equalized rating scheme. Opponents felt that
the federal legislation was introduced by the New York Congress-
woman solely to alter New York's self-rating system .7" This assertion
was rebutted by demonstrating that eleven jurisdictions had higher
rates than the voluntary market77 and the trend of FAIR plan rat-
ing had been decidedly towards imposing higher rates.78
Given the clear Congressional intent of the 1968 Act to make
insurance available at a "reasonable cost,"7 the amendment's spon-
sor believed the amendment should not have been necessary. 0 How-
ever, FAIR plans came into being in the aftermath of the rioting of
the 1960's, as an emergency response to the inner city insurance
crisis. Ten years later, the sense of urgency was gone. Public atten-
tion waned. Redlining practices proliferated," resulting in
76. New York state law requires that the premiums the FAIR plan collects be sufficient
to pay for the claims that it satisfies. This policy is referred to as "self-rating." N.Y. INS. LAW
§§ 651-62 (McKinney Supp. 1978). Due to the presence of some legitimately higher risk
properties covered by the plan, a greater ratio of claims are paid than in the normal market.
Therefore, premium rates charged for FAIR plan policies range from 250 to 500 percent of
private market rates for similar properties. News from Congresswoman Holtzman (Jan. 8,
1979). The sentiment that the amendment was designed to alter only New York's policy is
expressed as follows: "We should not, because there is a problem in the State of New York,
be passing a Federal law which in effect will dictate in an extremely rigid way how the other
49 States shall handle the rating of their insurance policies." 124 CONG. REC. H7123 (daily
ed. July 21, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Brown).
77. The following eleven states had FAIR plan rates exceeding those in the voluntary
market before the Holtzman amendment: Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Illinois uses an "open
rating law," so that FAIR plan rates cannot be compared to voluntary market rates. PIPSO
REPORT, supra note 29, at 10, 16.
78. In 1975. only three states had higher FAIR plan rates than the private market. By
1979, the number had increased to eleven with rate disparities. Holtzman Testimony, supra
note 73, at 1.
79. See note 25 supra.
80. Holtzman Testimony, supra note 73, at 2.
81. The FIA described the difficulties inherent in FAIR plans as follows:
The keystone in the arch of deficiencies in the property residual market-indeed within
the total property and liability market-is continuation of the absolute right of insurer
underwriters to deny essential insurance to applicants without reason or for arbitrary
and capricious reasons which are entirely subjective in nature and which may have
much more to do with the insurers' competitive moods, modes, and postures than with
the objectively determined loss-potential characteristics of the risks. So long as the
exercise of untrammeled underwriting selection remains the right of insurers, the in-
surance regulator has little, if any, means of assisting the disadvantaged insurance
consumer. Measures such as anti-discrimination statutes and regulations have been
proved demonstrably inadequate to halt discrimination save in cases of the most
blatant exercise of racial or ethnic discrimination ....
INSURANCE CRisis REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.
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"dumping"8 marginal insurance risks into the residual FAIR plan
market. The need for the Holtzman amendment became apparent.
The amendment's provision for rate parity is one weapon to combat
the effects of redlining by eliminating premium levels which are
excessive for the sole reason that the property was denied insurance
in the voluntary market.
The insurance industry was never enthusiastic about insuring
inner city properties. 3 However, the industry responded to the fed-
82. In British and Foreign Marine Insurance Co. v. Stewart, 30 N.Y.2d 53, 281 N.E.2d
149, 330 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1970), the New York Insurance Department tested the propriety of
"dumping" risks previously written in the voluntary market into the newly created FAIR
plans. The statutory provisions of the New York FAIR plan required mandatory participation
in the residual market pool with insurance companies sharing profits and losses according to
their share of business written in the state. The "Royal Globe Insurance Companies" (a single
business enterprise of seven insurance companies) proceeded to substantially reduce their fire
insurance liability in ghetto or riot-prone areas by cancelling or not renewing commercial
insurance policies in these areas. The New York Insurance Department fined Royal Globe
for racial discrimination based on its systematic cancellation of commerical line policies in
predominantly black areas in violation of N.Y. INS. LAW § 40(10) (McKinney 1966) which
provides in pertinent part that no insurance company "shall make any distinction or discrimi-
nation between persons because of race, color, creed or national origin, as to the premiums
or rates charged for insurance policies or in any other manner whatever." Id.
The insurance company successfully appealed based on their contention that the actions
were prompted by legitimate business judgment (to avoid over-commitment to riot-prone
areas) rather than by racially discriminatory motives. The court held that geographic dis-
crimination, irrespective of the racial composition of the geographic area, did not constitute
racial discrimination. The court based its holding on a twofold rationale. First, the insurance
companies continued to write "personal line" fire insurance in the designated areas, thus
dispelling a discriminatory motive. Second, the effect of the cancellation by these insurance
companies was to force the commercial property owners to seek insurance coverage from the
state FAIR plan. The court noted that requiring certain owners of high risk properties to
obtain insurance through the residual market mechanism was "precisely the reason that the
pool was established." 30 N.Y.2d at 60, 281 N.E.2d at 152, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The result
was the vindication of the untrammeled discretion of insurance companies to commit risks
to the residual market mechanisms, i.e., FAIR plans.
83. See notes 10, 13 supra. However, the insurance industry has taken some steps to meet
the special problems of serving the residual insurance market. The National Committee on
Property Insurance (NCPI) is a non-profit advisory organization created in 1976. The Prop-
erty Insurance Plans Service Office (PIPSO) coordinates activites and provides information
and other services to the twenty-eight FAIR. plans. PIPSO, once a division of the Insurance
Services Office (ISO), is now a division of NCPI. The objectives of NCPI are to:
* Improve the public image of FAIR Plans-Now
* Represen't the interests of property insurers in providing oversight review of residual
market activities
* Provide management assistance and consulting expertise to the Plans and establish
improved standards for their performance.
NATIONAL COMMrITEE ON PROPERTY INSURANCE, NEW PERSPECTIVES iii (Sept. 1, 1978).
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eral government's proposals by participating in state authorized
FAIR plans. Federal riot reinsurance was the primary inducement
offered to the insurance companies in return for their cooperation. 4
Protection from insolvency due to nationwide rioting or major riot-
ing in a more concentrated area, is essentially the "carrot" proffered
by the federal governement 5  The amendment provides that states
which fail to restructure their FAIR plan rating schemes by January
31, 1979, if this is necessary to bring these states into compliance
with the rate parity provision, will disqualify insurance companies
from obtaining reinsurance on risks written in those states. The
Holtzman amendment requires FAIR plan rates to be no higher
than those of the state's major rating organization. This level is used
as a general indicator of current competitive rates by the insurance
companies. Actual rates are typically lower than this recommenda-
-tion. 1
The FIA's studies demonstrate that insurance companies have a
consistently higher overall profit in FAIR plan states than in non-
FAIR plan states."s While numerous other factors such as variable
corporate tax treatment and the effect of urban populations on un-
derwriting costs may affect these results, it is significant that FAIR
plans have not prevented the industry from maintaining a high level
of profits.85 These considerations however, do not alleviate the per-
ennial insurance residual market problem. Insurance is a profit-
making industry, but also a social and economic necessity. The
attempt to strike a balance between socially mandated rates and
actuarially sound rates"9 is the threshold issue which is rarely ad-
dressed. The Holtzman amendment reflects the federal govern-
84. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb-7 to -10.
85. The Panel Report recommended providing riot reinsurance as a backup for insurance
companies in the event of large riot losses to encourage the industry to provide essential
property insurance for inner cities. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
86. INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 26.
87. Id.
88. Congresswoman Holtzman also noted that compliance with the Holtzman amend-
ment will not bankrupt the insurance industry.
In fact, since the risk will simply be spread more broadly statewide, it is unlikely that
the industry will suffer any financial dislocation whatsoever. In any event, given the
fact that Business Week reported that the property-casualty insurers posted a record
21% return on net worth in 1977 (its previous high was 12% in 1972), I am certain the
industry can survive the Holtzman Amendment.
Holtzman Testimony, supra note 73, at 4-5.
89. See discussion of underwriting profits, combined loss and expense ratio, investment
profit, and rate of return in PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 40-48.
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ment's commitment to the public policy of making property insur-
ance available in urban core areas. Its implementation curtails the
practice of price differentiation based on whether insurance is ob-
tained in the voluntary market or the state authorized FAIR plan.
The most important effect is the reduction of the disparate treat-
ment that resulted from classification as a FAIR plan property."
However, other practices remain which impose harsher treatment
on FAIR plan properties. For instance, although both FAIR plan
and voluntary market properties are subject to condition sur-
charges, these are only a practical reality for FAIR plan properties.
Because of the expense constraints on insurers, private market prop-
erties are rarely inspected,' making assessment of condition charges
extremely unlikely. Alternatively, inspection is almost universal in
the residual market, allowing surcharges to be levied at the individ-
ual inspector's discretion. A further distinction exists in the more
liberal policy terms which accompany comprehensive package poli-
cies in the voluntary market. FAIR plans generally provide only the
minimum coverage, thereby eliminating the benefits of cost-
efficient package policies." It is also rare for FAIR plan insureds to
receive the same customer services as private market policyhold-
ers, 3 e.g., premium payment plans and available agents.
From 1969 to the end of end of 1977, FAIR plans have had nation-
wide operating losses of $16,787,000.1 These losses are absorbed by
90. INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 26.
91. The National Association of Independent Insurers (NAIl) estimates that a thorough
inspection of a dwelling costs between $25 and $50. Due to the political, social, and competi-
tive pressures on insurers to keep prices down, the companies assert that they must carefully
allocate the inspections which can be afforded. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS,
ARSON-FOR-PROFIT AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: VICTIM OR VILLAIN? 2 (1978).
92. Id. at 20-21.
93. Holtzman Testimony, supra note 73, at 8.
94. FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT, FAIR PLAN OPERATING PoSrrIONS (Aug. 1978). The following figures provide statistical
operational data concerning the operations of FAIR plans from 1969 to 1977:
Written premiums: $1,322,690,000.
Investment income: 38,757,000.
Total Operating Income: $1,361,447,000.
Losses paid: $1,037,698,000.
Inspection expense: 29,460,000.
Commissions to agents: 136,597,000.
All other operating expenses: 174,479,000.
Total Operating Expenses: $1,378,234,000.
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the industry and passed on to insurance consumers. The Holtzman
amendment denies reinsurance benefits to companies seeking to
reinsure risks in a state which provides that FAIR plan insureds
must subsidize their own losses, either completely or up to a certain
percentage. States which have failed to equalize FAIR plan rates
with voluntary market rates, excluding reasonable surcharges for
objectively determined and individualized hazardous conditions, no
longer qualify for federal riot reinsurance."
Operating Expenses: $1,378,234,000.
Operating Income: - 1,361,447,000.
Total Operating Results: -$ 16,787,000.
It should be noted that it was not expected that FAIR plans would operate at a profit. The
residual market mechanism was intended to provide a means for equitably sharing the risks
of providing essential property insurance to urban core properties and low value rural proper-
ties.
The most recent data compiled by the Property Insurance Plans Service Office (PIPSO)
for the first nine months of 1978 reveal a net operating loss of $25.4 million, representing a
55% decline in losses from the comparable 1977 experience. The statutory underwriting losses
were $32.9 million for this period. The reduced overall loss figure is reached by offsetting the
statutory underwriting loss by investment income of $7.5 million earned during the same nine
months. News from the National Committee on Property Insurance (NCPI) prepared by
Insurance Information Institute (April 4, 1979).
95. Conditioning the retention of federal riot reinsurance benefits on compliance with the
Holtzman amendment proved an inadequate incentive for those opponents who asserted that
federal riot reinsurance was a "bad buy." News from N.Y. State Senator Dunne 3 (Mar. 18,
1979). The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) completed a study
which opponents refer to in support of their contention that federal reinsurance is not neces-
sary. The report, found that since its inception in 1968, close to $84 million in premiums were
collected, while less than $14 million in claims were paid out. It was also suggested that if a
large riot occurred today, the federal government would pay only 3 to 5 percent of the losses.
Statement of Senator John R. Dunne on Recent Proposals Concerning Fire Insurance and the
New York FAIR Plan 11 (Feb. 27, 1979). The Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) re-
sponded to the NAIC study by demonstrating alternative situations in which the federal
government would pay greater percentages of major riot losses. The complex scheme of the
riot reinsurance program involves twenty-three layers of sharing of losses between the rein-
sured company, the state, the National Insurance Development Fund (NIDF), and if neces-
sary, the U.S. Treasury. The ultimate purpose which the reinsurance policy serves is to
protect insurance companies from insolvency due to catastrophic riot losses. The contract
provisions and the levels of sharing losses operate to insure that a particular company will
not be destroyed due to the excessive losses attending major rioting, according to FIA officials.
Opponents also assert that reinsurance is available in the voluntary market at slightly
higher rates. Others refute this point, arguing that participation in the reinsurance program
has always been voluntary, and yet insurance companies continually purchased reinsurance
from the federal government, apparently because it was the best buy. News from Congress-
women Holtzman 2 (Jan. 29, 1979). The assertion that riot reinsurance is readily available
in the private market was undermined by a recent suit brought in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia. Several insurance companies whose reinsurance contracts
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Seventeen of the twenty-eight FAIR plan states operated their
residual insurance pools without charging automatically higher
premiums on policies written through the FAIR plan." The Holtz-
man amendment did not affect the financial operations of these
plans. Six of the eleven states which required adjustment of their
FAIR plan rating structure in order to comply with the amendment
made the necessary changes. 7 On February 3, 1979, letters were sent
to the FAIR plan authorities in the five remaining non-complying
states: Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Virginia, cancel-
ling their entitlement to riot reinsurance for failure to revise their
automatically imposed FAIR plan premium surcharges."
Advocates of the recent statutory change point out the fairness of
spreading risks over the entire market rather than only the residual
market. The Urban Coalition and the New York Public Interest
Research Group (NY PIRG) estimated that "75% of FAIR plan
policyholders whose sole risk-increasing characteristic is geographic
were cancelled following the failure of certain states to comply with the Holtzman amend-
ment's rate equalization provision brought an action for reinstatement of their policies until
the end of the contract term. The complaint alleged that such coverage could not be ob-
tained elsewhere. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development, No. 79-1290 (D.D.C., filed May 11, 1979).
The federal government now offers riot reinsurance at a cost of approximately $.02 per
$100 of direct premiums earned. These rates are substantially lower than the rates in force
when the legislation was first passed in 1968. At that time, the cost was $1.25 per $100 of
direct premiums earned. The difference is attributed to the growth of the reserves accumu-
lated over the past eleven years. For private companies to offer the same type of coverage, it
would be necessary to first build up a reserve. It is estimated that the cost of private reinsur-
ance would be as much as sixty times higher than federal riot reinsurance until the reserve
was in force for several years.
Finally, federal riot reinsurance cannot be cancelled unless the reinsured violates the fed-
eral conditions set out in 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-9, which basically provides that the company
must participate in a state authorized FAIR plan which is in compliance with all federal
directives. It is unlikely that private reinsurers will put themselves in a position of total
exposure. Currently, reinsurers avoid this by providing that policies will be cancellable at the
reinsurer's option on short notice. In addition, the private reinsurance market has indicated
that FAIR plan business would not be reinsured at all. Under the federal riot reinsurance,
the insurance companies, not the FAIR plans, are the purchasers of reinsurance. According
to the federal provisions, the insurance companies can reinsure all policies with the federal
riot reinsurance which is offered. Panel Discussion, Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Is the "FAIR PLAN" Fair? (remarks by Congresswoman Holtzman) (May 17, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].
96. PIPSO REPORT, supra note 29, at 10.
97. Interview with Property Insurance Plans Service Office (PIPSO)(May 10, 1979).
98. Id.
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location are being forced to subsidize the genuinely riskier 25 per
cent."" The FIA anticipates a 1.5 to 2% increase in voluntary mar-
ket premiums in New York'00 and a negligible increase in the ten
other states with higher FAIR plan than private market rates,10'
99. News from N.Y. State Senator Dunne, Fire Insurance Under the "FAIR" Plan: The
Federal Directive to Lower Fire Insurance Rates For "FAIR" Plan Policyholders: Should
[New York) State Comply? 4 (Jan. 22, 1979).
100. INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 26.The New York State Assembly passed
a bill which would bring New York's FAIR plan rates into compliance with the Holtzman
amendment requiring parity between FAIR plan rates and rates in the voluntary market. The
bill was A. 1421-B, introduced by Assemblyman Nicolosi, and supported by both Governor
Carey and New York Insurance Superintendent Albert B. Lewis. Insurance Advocate, Feb.
3, 1979, at 5, 23-24, 31.
The New York State Senate did not pass any of the proposed bills which would have
brought the state into compliance with the Congressional mandate. Rather, a bill introduced
by Senate Majority Leader Warren M. Anderson and Senate Insurance Committee Chair-
man John R. Dunne (S. 1200-A) was passed on March 26, 1979. The bill provides that owners
of one to eight unit owner-occupied dwellings and small businesses (those with net gross
income of $300,000 or less) would be charged no more than 30% above private market rates
for policies written through the FAIR plan. News from N.Y. Senator Dunne (March 18, 1979).
No relief is provided for those property owners obtaining insurance through the FAIR plan
who do not fit within these classifications.
New York is at present the only major urban state which has not complied with the
Holtzman amendment. By not complying, New York has lost a state credit of $15 million in
reserve funds accumulated to offset any reimbursement to the National Insurance Develop-
ment Fund (NIDF) which might be required. This amount will be distributed among the
reserves of those states remaining eligible for participation in the riot reinsurance program.
New York has also lost access to an additional $28 million nationwide reserve similarly
designed to offset any necessary state reimbursement to the NIDF. Finally, the effect of
noncompliance will be that the FAIR plan rates will remain significantly higher than volun-
tary market rates and the voluntary market rates will also be increased to absorb the extra
cost of purchasing riot reinsurance. News from Congresswoman Holtzman 2-3 (Jan. 29, 1979).
It is noteworthy that although the New York Property Insurance Underwriting Association
(FAIR plan) has experienced statutory underwriting losses of $66 million since its inception
in 1968, the plan produced an $8 million underwriting gain in 1978. The statutory underwrit-
ing loss figure reduced by investment income of $19 million, resulted in an operating loss,
before further adjustment, of $47 million. This figure was further reduced by $35 million in
assessments against member companies to offset the unprofitable years, yielding a net loss
of $12 million. News from New York Property Insurance Underwriting Association, prepared
by Insurance Information Institute (Jan. 19, 1979). Considering that the creation of the FAIR
plans reduced the insurance industry's private market exposure to properties perceived to be
high risks, one might have expected that the rates in the voluntary market would have been
commensurately reduced. This did not occur. It could be argued that this benefit which
accrued to the industry would offset any additional burden of complying with the Holtzman
amendment. Panel Discussion, supra note 95.
101. The anticipated increase in these states is $.25 per year for the average private
market policyholder. This increase would be sufficient to equalize the FAIR plan rates with
the voluntary market rates. 124 CONG. REC. H7128 (daily ed. July 21, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Holtzman).
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with no adjustment in the majority of states. 02 This increase would
offset the net operating deficiencies resulting from the reduced
premiums.
Some view the rate parity mandate as inordinate federal interven-
tion in a state concern. 03 The major argument is that the federal
government is usurping the state's legislative and regulatory rate-
making prerogatives in the insurance field. 104 Those who support
this view are not persuaded by the assertion that the Holtzman
amendment does not set rates, but merely standards to which the
states must comply to remain eligible for riot reinsurance. Others
emphasize the federal government's responsibility to taxpayers
on the basis of (1) the FIA's borrowing power of up to $250 million
in the event that premiums received and the resources of the Na-
tional Insurance Development (NIDF) are insufficient to cover cata-
strophic riot losses, 05 and (2) the obligation of the federal govern-
ment to see that the $500 billion'0 1 of federal riot reinsurance is
distributed equitably.0 7 Such reinsurance protection for insurance
companies and the states is percieved as justification for the federal
intervention necessary to impose reasonable conditions on FAIR
plans. The Holtzman amendment reaffirms the original purpose of
Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plans: to insure the
availability and affordability of property insurance as a necessary
tool in the revitalization of American cities. 08
102. INSURANCE CRisis REPORT, supra note 10, at 25. The actual experience of rate parity
has increased voluntary rates in three states as follows: 1.0% in-Massachusetts, 0.8% in New
Jersey, and 0.2% in Pennsylvania. In New York, an increase of $3 to $4 per policy is expected
to reduce FAIR plan rates by 60% per year or $160 per year for average dwellings. Holtzman
Testimony, supra note 73, at 4.
103. "The amendment is clearly, purely, and simply Federal intervention in a State
matter." 124 CONG. RPc. H7125 (daily ed. July 21, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Wylie). Those who
assert that this is an unwarranted federal intervention in a state matter discount the role the
federal government has taken from the beginning, e.g., organizing the initial investigatory
panel (The President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas), enact-
ing the federal legislation authorizing FAIR plans (Urban Property Protection and Reinsur-
ance Act of 1968). which provided certain administrative and reporting procedures in addition
to minimum guidelines relating to insurance availability. The federal government's role is to
offer riot reinsurance to insurance companies that participate in FAIR plans operating in
accordance with federal standards and to review operations with regard to the effectiveness
of FAIR plans in making essential property insurance readily available.
104. 124 CONG. REC. H7124 (daily ed. July 21, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Brown).
105. 12 U.S.C. § 1735d(b).
106. 124 CONG. REC. H1593 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1978) (Schedule 9, Insurance Commit-
ments, as of Sept. 30. 1977).
107. 124 CONG. REc. H7127 (daily ed. July 21, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Lundine).
108. See note 25 supra.
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V. FAIR Plans and Arson-for-Profit
In assessing the problem of arson-for-profit in FAIR plans, it is
important to recognize that by so defining the investigation, a corre-
lation is attempted which addresses subdivisions of both the crime
and the target. Arson related insurance fraud, commonly known as
arson-for-profit, is only one of various categories of arson.'"1 Like-
wise, FAIR plans represent only a small segment of the insurance
industry.
The Commerce Department's study, Arson: America's Malignant
Crime,"10 recommended a plan of action to combat the national
arson problem. The report indicated that the crime of arson
"recognizes neither political nor geographic boundaries.""' The re-
port identified nine major areas requiring attention. "2 These include
defining the responsibilities of those agencies concerned with the
arson situation, conducting research to aid in arson investigation
and prevention, developing specialized training programs, improv-
ing data collection and reporting systems, and developing a uniform
terminology for an effective interdisciplinary attack on the arson
problem."
While numerous recommendations were specifically directed to
the insurance industry, the FAIR plans were not singled out as re-
quiring different or greater measures to reduce insurance-related
arson. Training programs were suggested for all insurance adjusters
and other claims personnel."' The report also encouraged re-
examination of all insurance underwriting practices which impact
on arson, particularly the problem of overinsurance. 15 Further, the
109. The National Fire Protection Association identifies at least eight categories of arson.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ARSON-FOR-
PROFIT: MORE COULD BE DONE To REDUCE IT 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
The categories identified were: fraud fires to collect insurance (arson-for-profit), political
fires, pyromaniac fires, crime cover-up fires, spite fires, vanity fires (to allow the arsonist to
appear as a hero in taking countermeasures), "psycho fires" set for no rational motive, and
vandalism fires set for thrills. Id. at 5-6.
110. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL FIRE PREVENTION AND CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
(NFPCA), NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR FIRE PREVENTION AND CONTROL, ARSON: AMERICA'S MALIG-
NANT CRIME (Sept. 1976) [hereinafter cited as MALIGNANT CRIME].
111. Id. at v.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id. The other "needs areas" identified were: reclassifying arson in national reporting
systems as a major offense, educating the public about the consequences of arson, promulgat-
ing effective laws and regulations, and identifying sources of funding to combat arson. Id.
114. Id. at 17.
115. Id. at 21.
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study stressed the need to avoid potential arson risks through
inspections of property and collection of other relevant data before
issuing a policy.I" In this regard, the report noted that the attempts
being made by FAIR plans to prevent arson should be recognized
and encouraged."' Analysis of this arson report supports the conclu-
sion that arson is a national problem, and that arson-for-profit is an
insurance problem not endemic to FAIR plans. Therefore, the solu-
tion necessarily transcends the FAIR plans and requires the coordi-
nated efforts of government and industry.
A recent report by the Comptroller General of the United States
(GAO Report) examined the extent to which FAIR plans provide an
incentive for insureds to commit arson-for-profit.II The conclusion
stated: "FAIR Plan and insurance industry officials believe that
arson-for-profit is a serious problem in the FAIR Plans as well as in
the private insurance market."" The significance of the arson
problem in the FAIR plans could not be more authoritatively estab-
lished because of the unavailability of specific data.'"" The report
was based on consideration of only nine out of the twenty-eight
FAIR plans.'' Statistics on arson-for-profit involved only three
states."2 The report's attempt to demonstrate a causal relationship
116. Id.
117. Id. at 22.
118. Letter from the Comptroller General of the U.S. to Senator Charles H. Percy I (May
31, 1978), reprinted in GAO REPORT, supra note 109 [hereinafter cited as Letter from the
Comptroller Generall.
119. GAO REPORT, supra note 109, at 25 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 10. However, according to statistics compiled from data filed with the FIA by
the FAIR plans, "about 1,000,000 American families and businesses are insured through FAIR
Plans, and less than five percent of these have had claims of any nature, much less arson-
for-profit. In any given year, 95 percent of policyholders in the various FAIR Plans have no
losses." Letter from Patricia Roberts, then Secretary of HUD, to Senator Abraham A. Ribi-
coff, Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs 1 (Aug. 29, 1978).
121. GAO REPORT, supra note 109, at 1.
122. Id. at 10-11. Although the presentation of these limited'statistics is meant to demon-
strate a relationship between arson-for-profit and FAIR plans, the statistics provided refer
generally to arson, or to individual estimates of the broad category of arson, or to the even
more inclusive classification of arson or suspicious fires. The report noted that in Illinois, the
Metropolitan Chicago Loss Bureau found that 33% (685) of FAIR plan claims paid in 1977,
totalling $7.7 million, were incendiary, i.e., arson and arson-for profit. In Massachusetts, one
FAIR plan official estimated that 40% of the arson in the state was FAIR plan related
although the plan writes only 15% of the insurance in Massachusetts. In Pennsylvania,
records of arson or suspicious fire losses in the FAIR plan, mostly occurring in 1976 and 1977,
showed losses of $1.8 million. Id. The dearth of arson-for-profit statistics is attributed to both
the difficulty in developing them and inadequate fire, police, and FAIR plan investigations.
Id. at 10.
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between FAIR plans and arson fraud fails, because throughout the
study the problem appeared to be equally prevalent in the private
insurance field.2 3 It is also noteworthy that in preparing the report,
none of the state insurance departments, which have direct super-
visory authority over FAIR plans, were contacted.'24 The FIA was
also not formally consulted prior to the release of the report. 25
Two basic criticisms of FAIR plan operations were pinpointed as
arson fraud incentives: overinsurance and under-selectivity.'
These will be examined separately. The report stated that overin-
surance of FAIR plan properties created an incentive to arson-for-
profit.'27 Overinsurance could occur in two ways: initial overvalua-
tion of the property resulting from granting insurance requests
without attempting to assess the actual or market value, 2 ' or subse-
quent overvaluation of the property due to external factors after the
policy is written which make the property worth less, i.e., the declin-
ing neighborhood syndrome. 2 '
The GAO Report examined the effects of overinsurance, focusing
on consideration of the method of valuation used in paying fire loss
claims. Generally, depreciation is taken into account and will result
in less than full payment on a claim. Beyond this, what occurs
varies with each jurisdiction. Many FAIR plan states value proper-
123. Id. at 5-6, 13.
124. Id. at 27-29.
125. Letter from the Comptroller General, supra note 118, at 5. The FIA responded to the
General Accounting Office's report, Arson-For-Profit: More Could Be Done To Reduce It (see
note 108 supra), by noting that despite its broad title, the report only examined arson-for-
profit in the FAIR plans, and could lead a reader to erroneously conclude that arson-for-profit
occurs primarily in these plans rather than in the general insurance market. Letter from
Patricia Roberts Harris to Senator Ribicoff (Aug. 29, 1978).
126. GAO REPORT, supra note 109, at 12-24.
127. Id. at 12.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id. at 17. There is a certain difficulty inherent in the charge that overinsurance
results from the general decline of a neighborhood. The 1968 Act specifically prohibited the
consideration of "environmental hazards" in deciding whether to grant insurance.
"Environmental hazard" is defined as "any hazardous condition that might give rise to loss
under an insurance contract, but which is beyond the control of the property owner ... " 12
U.S.C. § 1749bbb-2(a)(4). To consider these same factors in reaching the conclusion that a
property is overinsured does not fit within the intent of the legislation. However, although
ideally the insured's property should be valued without reference to other properties, the
"market value" formula is inextricably connected to neighborhood. Therefore, the insured's
recovery will necessarily be affected by external factors beyond his control which may pre-
clude him from receiving proceeds sufficient to rebuild. This often results in abandonment
and perpetuation of the cycle of urban decay.
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ties according to the "actual cash value" at the time of loss, which
is often determined by the "replacement cost less depreciation"
test. 30 The avowed problem with this formulation is that because
many FAIR plan properties are in economically declining neighbor-
hoods, the "actual cash value" award can be much greater than the
fair market value, creating an incentive to commit arson.
A number of states alleviated the valuation discrepancy by utiliz-
ing the "broad evidence" rule to determine "actual cash value."''
Assessment of property value by this method requires reference to
various criteria, including market, rental, and economic value, to
supplement the "replacement cost less depreciation" formula. 3 '
The GAO Report indicated that "[p]roperty owners in these States
.. .are not likely to be overcompensated for fire losses.' ' 33 Courts
which adhere to the "broad evidence" rule may give greater weight
to the "replacement cost less depreciation" feature when the in-
sured indicates a willingness to rebuild the destroyed property. The
flexibility of the "broad evidence" rule is more likely to allow the
court to take the insured's intent into consideration in this regard.
These considerations support the conclusion that the "broad evi-
130. GAO REPORT, supra note 109, at 16.
131. Id.
132. Id. McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928), was the
first case to employ the "broad evidence" rule.
133. Letter from the Comptroller General, supra note 118, at 4. It is interesting to note
that the indictment of overinsurance based on the initial overvaluation of property was
directed at the same states the GAO REPORT praised for discouraging overpayment by using
the "broad evidence" rule. The overinsurance charge is based on the practice of failing to
assess property value at the time the policy is written. Since the "actual cash value" method
authorizes payment based on the value at the time of loss, these states argue that initial
valuation is costly and unnecessary double work. However, the failure to inspect the insured's
premises, leading to overvaluation, is more likely to create an incentive to commit arson, since
the insured is unlikely to be aware of judicial remedies which protect insurance companies
from excessive claims of loss. For the insurance industry, the "broad evidence" rule is a more
attractive, if less successful, method for deterrence, because of higher commissions for brokers
and higher premiums for insurers. Several states (e.g., Massachusetts, Maryland, Pennsyl-
vania, and Rhode Island) have found initial valuation helpful in preventing overinsurance.
GAO REPORT, supra note 109, at 14-15.
The GAO REPORT recommended that all FAIR plans be required by federal regulation to
establish property value at the time of underwriting. The FIA disagreed, asserting that such
decisions should be left to the individual states, particularly when there is disagreement over
the most equitable method of property valuation in paying loss claims. Furthermore, accord-
ing to the Secretary of HUD, "a sweeping requirement could be used to limit adequate
coverage to deserving risks. The same measure which serves as a disincentive to arson profit-
eers can also prevent homeowners from being able to rebuild their homes after a fire." Letter
from Patricia Roberts Harris to Senator Ribicoff 2 (Aug. 29, 1978).
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dence" rule offers a more satisfactory approach to the difficult pro-
cess of valuation than other more rigid tests..'3
The "actual cash value" formula reflects the theory that the in-
sured should be put in substantially the same position as before the
loss, thus indemnifying the insured. Fair indemnification is
achieved by denying the insured overcompensation which would
provide an incentive to arson fraud. Fair compensation is often con-
sidered to require that the insured receive a sufficient recovery to
make reconstruction a feasible alternative."' This policy has the
positive ramification of encouraging community development, while
discouraging abandonment of properties and neighborhoods.
The FIA and NAIC are currently formulating a new policy form
which would limit cash payments after a loss to "market value'
' 13
(a disincentive to arson-for-profit), unless a building is recon-
structed at the same or nearby location. The policy would then allow
payment for the replacement of the structure up to a previously
agreed dollar amount (a disincentive to abandonment of the de-
stroyed building).137 The policy of awarding compensation based
upon whether the insured will rebuild is commendable. However,
a provision in the insurance contract which fixes the amount to be
paid to the insured who rebuilds may create the same problems
evident in "valued policy" contracts.'38 This difficulty could be
lessened by providing for periodic review and modification of the
contract terms according to an agreed method specified in the con-
tract. In the case of an owner's decision not to rebuild, there are
proposals which would allocate a portion of the claim recovery for
demolition costs where such action is warranted. 39 This would
134. More stringent tests include the "replacement cost less depreciation" formula and
the "valued policy" method.
135. The "replacement cost less depreciation" formula reflects this policy.
136. For a discussion of "market value," see Comment, Arson Fraud: Criminal Prosecu-
tion and Insurance Law, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 571 (1979).
137. Statement by Gloria M. Jimenez, Federal Insurance Administrator, before the Sen-
ate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 5 (Sept. 14, 1978) [hereinafter cited as FIA
Statement].
138. See text accompanying notes 141-143 infra.
139. Statement by Gloria M. Jimenez, Federal Insurance Administrator, Government
Affairs Conference sponsored by the American Insurance Association 5 (Mar. 22, 1979). Ms.
Jimenez stated:
The insurance policy could . . . provide for the application of some portion of the
forfeited insurance proceeds to defray the cost to the city of demolition of the building
and removal of debris. The Pennsylvania legislature is currently considering a bill
which would accomplish this by creating a lien in favor of the city upon insurance
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reduce the negative effect on neighborhoods caused by the presence
of abandoned structures, 40 and is therefore a practice which should
be encouraged.
Twenty states require insurers to pay the face amount of the
policy on total property losses.' This "valued policy" method may
reduce the tendency of insurers to overinsure,4 2 but it also serves
to fix the value of the property when numerous intervening factors
could lead to its devaluation. The result in this situation is the
alleged overinsurance despite compliance with the GAO Report's
suggestion to value the property when the policy is written.' The
"valued policy" laws have the advantages of providing certainty
and discouraging litigation. Moreover, this policy most likely com-
ports with the insured's understanding of the insurance agreement
regarding the amount of recovery in the event of a loss. However,
the inflexibility of the valuation procedures can provide as much of
an incentive to arson fraud as the lure of replacement cost proceeds.
Thus, despite certain positive features, the "valued policy" method
should be rejected in favor of the "broad evidence" rule.
The GAO Report found that FAIR plans could operate more effi-
ciently if given more authority to deny or limit insurance to high risk
properties.'44 According to the report, FAIR plan officials expressed
the need for more flexibility in underwriting prerogatives.'45 The FIA
asserts that FAIR plan underwriters can make judgments regarding
which properties to insure according to the statutory and regulatory
standards which clearly grant this discretion. 4 ' Insurance must only
proceeds for such purposes. While all legislative solutions to this question may not be
equally acceptable, it would seem to be a worthwhile concept to work toward.
Id.
140. For an in-depth study of the process of abandonment, see WOMEN'S CITY CLUB OF NEW
YORK, INC., WITH LOVE AND AFFECTION, A STUDY OF BUILDING ABANDONMENT (1977).
141. GAO REPORT, supra note 109, at 16-17.
142. Id. at 17. However, a factor contrary to this tendency is the incentive for insurance
agents and brokers to encourage property owners to purchase. more insurance than may be
necessary because their fees will thereby be commensurately increased. Id. at 15-16.
143. Id. at 26. See note 129 supra.
144. Id. at 17. One insurance company official expressed the view that since "the original
purpose of FAIR plans was to provide insurance in those instances where the insurance
industry would' not 'solely because of where the property is located' . . . FAIR Plans . . .
should be granted all of the perogatives [sic] of the industry except location." Id. at 20.
The FIA's position is that the FAIR plans are able to use their discretion and are not re-
quired to insure risks that do not meet "reasonable underwriting criteria." Id. at 24. Since
the inception of FAIR plans, over 227,000 out of approximately 2.9 million applications have
been denied for various reasons. FIA Statement, supra note 137, at 5-6.
145. GAO REPORT, supra note 109, at 17.
146. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3; 24 C.F.R. § 1905.3, 1905.7 (1978).
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be written on properties meeting "reasonable underwriting stan-
dards," excluding consideration of environmental hazards. The FIA
also notes that all requests for altering FAIR plan underwriting
requirements, approved by state insurance authorities, were like-
wise approved by the FIA."17 It appears that there is some confusion
concerning taking the initiative for implementing changes.' The
confusion is dispelled by reference to the federal guidelines for FAIR
plans, which demonstrate the intent to allow states to adopt regula-
tions to meet their own needs.'
Three major problems cited by the FAIR plan officials'" con-
tacted during the GAO study were (1) the inability to consider the
"moral hazard"'' factor (2) the requirement to provide immediate
coverage through a binder provision before inspection' (3) the ne-
cessity for giving thirty days notice before cancellation of an insur-
ance policy.' The FIA takes the position that provisions exist to
remedy these problems. For instance, the "moral hazard" factor can
be taken into consideration in declining to insure a risk. FIA regula-
tions permit denial of insurance based on "specific characteristics
of ownership, condition, occupancy, or maintenance that are viola-
tive of law or public policy."'' The FIA also does not require imme-
diate coverage, but allows up to twenty calendar days to delay cov-
erage pending inspection.' Finally, the FIA has recommended five-
day cancellation notices as HUD policy for several years. At present,
three states have adopted this policy. 5 ' Information concerning
147. Federal Insurance Administration, Dep't of HUD, Memorandum: Specific GAO
Points Warranting Clarification 7 (1978).
148. ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMISION, ARSONS: A REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 41 (May 1978) [hereinafter cited as ARSONS].
149. The 1968 Act states that FAIR plans "must be approved by, and administered under
the supervision of the State insurance authority.... Such plans may vary in detail from State
to State because of local conditions .... " 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(b). The federal govern-
ment is responsible for periodic review of each plan "in order to assure that such plan is
effectively making essential property insurance readily available. ... Id. § 1749bbb-6a.
150. GAO REPORT, supra note 109, at 17.
151. "Moral hazard" is the term used to refer to the risk element based on the character,
attitude, and purpose of the insured. Factors considered in assessing this risk could include
information regarding the person's or company's financial condition, tax arrearages, building
code violations, and the insured's past fire history. Id. at 20.
152. 24 C.F.R. § 1905.6 (1978).
153. Id. § 1905.9 (1978).
154. Id. § 1905.7(c)(3) (1978).
155. Id. § 1905.6(b)(1) (1978).
156. Letter from Patricia Roberts Harris to Senator Ribicoff 4 (Aug. 22, 1978).
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waiver of this provision was distributed to all FAIR plans in 1974
through PIPSO, the national trade organization for FAIR plans.
These facts undermine the position that federal regulations impede
state efforts to implement effective and innovative operational poli-
cies.
Various groups advocate the effectiveness of increasing controls
on the selection and screening process to eliminate arson-for-profit
risks in the FAIR plan.'57 However, since there is no substantiation
at present that more arson-for-profit occurs in the FAIR plan than
the voluntary market,'58 there is no rational basis to pursue overzeal-
ous underwriting screening in one market and not the other. The
Property Loss Insurance Register'59 provides a system where rele-
vant arson prevention information can be easily compiled and read-
ily ascertained. Four basic computer searches coordinate data re-
vealing the following information: the loss history of an individual
or corporate insured, the loss history at a particular location, undis-
closed duplicative insurance, and combinations of individuals in-
volved in losses, regardless of their identification as owner or mort-
gagee.11 This information is a valuable tool for insurance companies
157. See MALIGNANT CRIME, supra note 110, at 21; ARSONS, supra note 148, at 37; GAO
REPORT, supra note 109, at 17; News from New York Property Insurance Underwriting Asso-
ciation, prepared by Insurance Information Institute (Jan. 19, 1979).
158. INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 40. The available evidence indicates that
arson-for-profit is an increasing problem of national proportions. This is demonstrated by the
fact that in both Texas and Florida, where there are no FAIR plans, there is an increasingly
high incidence of arson, including arson-for-profit. Id. at 39. The only grand jury to consider
the allegation that arson-for-profit and FAIR plans can be linked in a cause and effect
relationship found the charge to be without merit. The Missouri Grand Jury noted:
We have been led to believe that pressures from Washington force insurers writing
coverage under the FAIR Plan to accept many risks contrary to their best judgment.
Our understanding is directly contrary to this. Nowhere did we find that the Federal
directives or guidelines required insurers to assume questionable, let alone ridiculous,
risks.
INSURANCE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 39.
159. The Property Insurance Loss Register presently has 418 companies as subscribers,
representing about 90% of premium dollars in the nation. The system was designed to comply
with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t(1976). Privacy laws and free access
to loss potential information for insurers serve important, yet conflicting, social policies. At
least twenty-five states have acted to give insurance companies immunity against civil ac-
tions for damages based on sharing information with fire, police, and other public sector
officials. These include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana. Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York,
North Carolina. North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Interview with Property Insurance Loss Register Office (May 22, 1979).
160. Id.
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in their voluntary, as well as their residual market underwriting
activity. Despite nationwide interest in reducing arson, underwrit-
ing techniques which operate to deny essential property insurance
to deserving property owners in the FAIR plans cannot be toler-
ated."
In addition to underwriting screening, emphasis should be placed
on rigorous post-claim review' as an effective deterrent. Insurers
argue that opposing societal demands dictate conflicting mes-
sages. 113 Insurance companies are urged to withhold payment on
suspicious claims, but are pressured to pay legitimate claims once
proof of loss is established. Distinguishing between valid and fraud-
ulent claims is not an easy task. Proving the distinction is even more
difficult. The insurance industry is regulated by government and
competitive market forces. At present, there is little incentive to
pursue costly litigation with no guarantee of success. The possibility
of punitive damage suits and the one percent nationwide conviction
rate for arson are further deterrents. 6 4
A coordinated arson offensive must work to limit the safety, ease,
and profitability of committing arson. Defining arson-for-profit as
a problem particularly prevalent and essentially confined to FAIR
plans is counterproductive for the insurance industry and will
161. Efforts to reduce arson-for-profit should confine the preventive measures to attacking
owner-involved arson fraud. It is improper to formulate policies on the assumption that all
arson is first-party arson, i.e., arson by the property owner motivated by the intention to
collect insurance proceeds. In a great many cases, the property owner is the innocent victim
of third-party arson. i.e., arson committed for revenge or a variety of other reasons. See note
109 supra.
162. MALIGNANT CRIME, supra note 110, at 9-13, 17; ARSONS, supra note 148, at 36. The
FIA also strongly supports this policy. Ms. Jimenez advocated the effectiveness of deterrence
through diligent law enforcement post-crime efforts:
More must be done by every involved sector of society to increase the risk of commit-
ting arson. Experienced arson investigators stress that arson-for-profit is largely a
white-collar crime, and studies have shown that the threat of prosecution is a serious
deterrent to such crime. The challenge, therefore, is to strengthen the chain which
leads from arson detection to prosecution and conviction. One of the weakest links in
this chain at present, according to investigators, is the myth that arson cannot be
proven. Efforts should be made to dispel this myth.
Statement by Gloria M. Jimenez, Federal Insurance Administrator, Government Affairs
Conference sponsored by the American Insurance Association 8 (Mar. 22, 1979).
163. NATIONAL Ass'N OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS, ARSON-FOR-PROFIT AND THE INSURANCE IN-
DUSTRY: VILLAIN OR VICTIM? (1978).
164. Id. at 2-3.
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impede national efforts directed at reducing the incidence of the
crime of arson. 1 5
VI. Conclusion
Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plans were author-
ized by federal legislation to provide essentail commercial and habi-
tational property insurance to those unable to obtain it in the volun-
tary market. FAIR plans have been effective. A prospective insured
cannot be denied insurance for arbitrary or capricious reasons. Al-
though the decision to insure property through the voluntary or
residual market remains the prerogative of insurance underwriters,
the Holtzman amendment has reduced the disparate consequences
resulting from assignment of insureds to FAIR plans.
A decade after the inception of FAIR plans, Congress passed the
Holtzman amendment, reaffirming the original intent of the Urban
Property and Reinsurance Act of 1968 to make property insurance
available at affordable rates. Premiums charged for FAIR plan in-
surance must be no higher than those charged in the voluntary
market, and members of the public, independent of the insurance
industry, must comprise one-third of all governing and advisory
FAIR plan committees. Those states not in compliance with the
Holtzman amendment forfeited their access to federal riot reinsur-
ance. Arguments against adopting a rate-equalization provision are
often based on the assertion that riot reinsurance is available in the
private market. This rationale does not address the issue of the
unfairness of operating a FAIR plan without providing access to
insurance requirements at affordable rates.
It is possible that the charge that FAIR plans provide incentives
to arson-for-profit were publicized to obstruct adoption of the Holtz-
man amendment rate parity mandate. Examination of available
data provides no basis for the allegation that FAIR plans promote
a higher incidence of arson-for-profit. Since arson-for-profit is pri-
marily a white collar crime, attacks aimed solely at the insurance
residual market mechanism are misdirected. Anti-arson fraud ef-
forts and FAIR plans can comfortably co-exist. When urban revitali-
zation efforts have significantly reduced the effects of the
"insurance crisis," the residual insurance market will be integrated
165. For an overview of the problems related to arson fraud, see Comment, Arson Fraud:
Criminal Prosecution and Insurance Law, 7 FoRDH M URB. L.J. 541 (1979).
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into the voluntary market. At such time, the FAIR plans will have
achieved their original objective.
Joanne Dwyer
